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ABSTRACT
INTELLIGENT THREAT-AWARE RESPONSE SYSTEM IN
SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKS
by Kunal Goswami
Software-defined networks decouple the control plane from the data plane,
enabling researchers to evaluate protocols and network configurations through the
centralized point of control, the controller. They provide easy management and
automation, scalability, and flexibility in the traditional computer network. In spite
of these advantages, software-defined networks fall prey to various denial-of-service
attacks specific to network protocols and applications despite their simplicity. There
is a need to implement intelligence in the controller as a countermeasure for not only
the various types of denial-of-service attacks but also the increasing sophistication
involved in them. In this paper, an intelligent threat-aware response system is
proposed for defending against any attack by using reinforcement learning.
Reinforcement learning can acquire intelligence for detection and reactive actions
through experience with various attacks. This experience is obtained from
interactions with the computer network through the controller. With the
combination of reinforcement learning and the software-defined networking controller,
the goal of the autonomous threat response system can be achieved.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Software-defined networking (SDN) provides an abstraction of programmability
in traditional computer networks. Computer networks can be simulated virtually and
interfaced through the SDN controller from topology configurations to
protocol-specific behavior. This abstraction is facilitated by OpenFlow [1], a protocol
which decouples the data plane from the control plane on the switch. OpenFlow
protocol also makes the computer network more flexible. In addition, since the
control plane is separated from the data plane, it is possible for researchers to deploy
and test various protocols in real-time.
However, along with all the advancements in the field of computer networks,
there have been advances for compromising the networks as well. Protocol features
such as three-way handshake in TCP, HTTP GET request processing, and ICMP
response can be exploited for selfish gains. The same features which provide a secure
connection for communication, availability, and hassle-free data transfer lead to the
misuse. A few examples of such misuse are TCP SYN flood attack, HTTP GET
Request flood attack, and Ping flood attack. Recent history of network attacks [2, 3]
brings to light the innovative approaches taken by adversaries in terms of
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. This calls for a measure which can surpass the same
innovation and counter the attacks.
The other concept which enters the picture is one of reinforcement learning [4].
It is a paradigm which closely imitates the human way of learning. The human brain
learns with the help of interaction with and feedback from a corresponding
environment. Given a state of the environment, the human brain evaluates the best
possible action to interact with it and gain the best possible outcome. The definition
of the word ‘‘best’’ is highly subjective. However, the same learning procedure helps
1
us understand concepts from natural language [5] to aeronautics [6]. This paper
presents an approach in which a reinforcement learning paradigm is combined with
SDN to create an intelligent threat-aware framework which is able to take responsive
actions, given access to network behavior information.
The SDN architecture enables the underlying computer network to be managed
with the help of the controller, the logical centralized point of access [1, 7]. A lot of
information in the form of network traffic data propagates through the computer
network. This information encodes the user-specific behavior, IP specific behavior,
and usage patterns. With the introduction of reinforcement learning, this information
can be represented in a succinct form of a ‘‘state’’. The state can then be utilized in a
state-based learning process to train an agent for taking reactive action against
network threats.
The proposed framework implements the above discussed principles with traffic
analyzer, reinforcement learning agent, and threat response modules. The traffic
analyzer module gathers information through the controller and represents it into a
form suitable for the reinforcement learning agent. The agent computes the likelihood
of the action with the maximum long-term benefit in terms of the computer network.
The selected action becomes the reaction of the controller for the corresponding
network threat.
Intelligent intrusion detection has been an area of research for quite some time;
many approaches have been developed using reinforcement learning [8, 9]. Some of
these approaches include providing a response to a network attack. Examples include
router throttling [10] and Q-learning [11] applied to routing. However, there are other
approaches to network attack prevention as well which solely focus on actions
provided by software-defined networks [12]. Frameworks such as AVANT GUARD
[13] and FLOW GUARD [14] focus on changing the flow rules in the data plane to
2
make software-defined networks more secure and developing a proxy firewall to
detect the changes in the network traffic, respectively. These approaches focus on
developing an intelligent response to networks or using software-defined networks to
prevent a network attack. This thesis focuses on delivering the best of both
reinforcement learning and software-defined networks.
The unique contributions of this work include a novel architecture consisting of
reinforcement learning combined with SDN to address network threats, network
condition monitoring through network congestion function, and implementation of
this framework integrated into an open-source SDN Controller RYU [15]. The scope
of network attacks covered by this framework at present includes various DoS attacks.
The rest of this document is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a brief
survey of similar work in this domain. Chapter 3 provides the details of the system
architecture and other implementation details. The experimental results of the
prototype are discussed in Chapter 4, followed by discussion in Chapter 5. Chapter 6
provides the future scope of this research and contains the conclusions derived from it.
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CHAPTER 2
Related Work
There are many approaches one can take to defend a computer network against
threats, some of which involve the use of sophisticated hardware to detect and nullify
threats. Others make use of the programmability offered by SDN. Recently, the
concept of combining intelligence with network security has been gaining in
popularity. This intelligence is of the form of machine learning applied to various
network statistics for threat detection and/or prevention. This chapter discusses
various approaches applied to security in SDN.
2.1 Software-Defined Network based Network Security
Padekar, Park, Hu and Chang [16] propose the AEGIS framework to protect
the SDN Controller and the network from erroneous network applications that misuse
controller APIs. The AEGIS framework follows a three-step process to secure the
controller: The first step is to identify all of the APIs that modify the internal data
for the network, the second step is to generate access rules which govern the behavior
of a network application, and the third step involves the decision engine which
intercepts and validates the API calls in real time to ensure safe operations. These
authors have developed a prototype and tested it against six network attacks for
evaluating the system.
Wang, Zheng, Lou and Hou [17], on the other hand, propose an enterprise
network security framework which utilizes the monitoring capabilities of SDN to
provide a flexible interface for taking actions against network attacks. They address
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against cloud infrastructures which are facilitated by
SDN. The authors argue that, with the help of a properly designed framework, one
can counter such network attacks solely with the help of SDN. To the best of their
knowledge, the authors were the first to propose a network defense architecture such
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as DaMask for DoS and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack mitigation.
Lim, Ha, Kim, Kim and Yang [18] discuss a SDN-based defense against DoS
and DDoS attacks by botnets. Due to the difficulties of identifying these attacks
using network monitoring, the responsibility lies on the victim server or host. The
authors propose a defense framework using the standard OpenFlow implementation
to thwart DDoS attacks. Their implementation relies on the victim server to
determine whether or not it is under a DDoS attack. Once the server confirms it, the
proposed solution suggests a redirection URL to all incoming requests and continues
blocking subsequent requests to the same IP address. The intuition followed by the
authors is simple; the preprogrammed bots cannot comprehend or change the address
of the victim immediately after the URL redirection is applied.
Wang, Xu and Gu [19] address the control plane to data plane saturation
attack on SDN controllers. They propose a framework called FLOODGUARD to
analyze the flow rules pushed on switches with the controller and prevent this attack.
Another framework which addresses security in SDN is AVANT-GUARD [13], which
addresses the attacks focused on the SDN controller itself. The authors propose an
extension to the data plane in the form of ‘‘connection migration’’ and ‘‘actuating
trigger.’’ These are novel contributions to the software-defined network environment
and help in minimizing the probability of saturation attacks on the controller. Braga,
Mota and Passito [20] propose a lightweight DoS detection framework using NOX
[21] controller. They use the concept of IP flows [22] to detect network attacks.
These frameworks certainly are well developed but can be extended when combined
with the capacity to take action against an attack.
Another approach to protecting the network involves the help of host IP
address mutation. Jafarian, Al-Shaer and Duan [23] propose a random host mutation
approach which assigns virtual IP addresses to all the hosts present in the network.
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The virtual IP addresses are changed at random intervals of time. The benefit is that
the adversaries cannot discover these hosts through scanning or worm propagation. It
is an ingenious way of defending against network attacks. However, it might fall prey
to an attacker who compromises an authorized system, who can then use the actual
IP addresses of these hosts to communicate.
2.2 Machine Learning based Network Security
Malialis and Kudenko [10] discuss an approach to intrusion detection using
reinforcement learning. The focus of their work is to inhibit DDoS attacks. They use
a multi-agent router throttling approach to regulate the traffic towards a victim in
such a way that it does not collapse. This approach proposes ‘‘coordinated team
learning’’ as an extension to the original multi-agent router throttling approach.
Coordinated team learning is decentralized, which is one of the biggest advantages it
has over the traditional approach. They experimented with up to 100 reinforcement
learning agents against dynamic attacks and managed to outperform state-of-the-art
router throttling procedures.
Another approach to intrusion detection in networks has been along the lines of
Q-learning [11], a novel approach indeed. Detecting network intrusion with the help
of a modified version of the traditional Q-learning algorithm, this framework achieves
an accuracy of 98%. The authors combine the Q-learning algorithm with rough set
theory to achieve higher classification results. Reinforcement learning is popularly
implemented for interacting with the system rather than classifying the state of the
system. Sengupta, Sen, Sil and Saha [11] developed an online system in which the
network packets become the actions in the system, and the traffic is categorized as
either ‘‘normal’’ or ‘‘anomaly.’’
Chung, Khatkar, Xing, Lee and Huang [24] propose the NICE framework for
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securing a virtual network environment. They focus on securing cloud systems which
provide virtual machines to users. Their framework prevents these virtual machines
from being zombie machines by using network intrusion detection. In their approach,
they classify network intrusion by using the similar activities of the users and
analyzing them. They also scan the virtual machines for vulnerabilities to check for
compromised machines.
Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBMs) [25] have also been used for network
anomaly detection. The work primarily revolves around classifying network traffic as
hostile or normal. The authors gather network data for training the RBM. However,
they state that ‘‘network traffic is very complex and unpredictable, and the model is
subject to changes over time, since anomalies are continuously evolving.’’ The
network traffic data are converted into a time series, and the algorithm is trained
based on a discriminative approach and a generalized approach. The generalized
approach trains on normal data, considering each data point by how well it fits with
the others, whereas the discriminative approach focuses on learning the difference
between hostile data points and normal data points. Cannady [26] developed an
intrusion detection system with the help of adaptive neural networks. The neural
network received many more inputs along with feedback from the system. The
trained system had an error rate of around 2% against known attacks. The author
also demonstrated that the neural network adapts very well to the new attack vectors
upon feeding them as input.
Wang, Chao, Lin, Lin and Lo [27] proposed an attack detection and mitigation
system in SDN. This system made the use of support vector machine (SVM)
algorithm to detect network attacks. The authors analyzed the features generated
from the network with decision tree algorithm and trained the SVM classifier to
detect threats. The mitigation action was taken through the northbound REST API
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of the controller with the help of a flow rule. Although this work has promise, it has
an inherent need of labeled data. For a dynamic environment such as SDN, it is not
really feasible to generate labels to depict all scenarios. Colbaugh and Glass [28]
propose a proactive framework for defense against cyber attacks. The authors
develop this framework by ‘‘modeling attacker / defender interaction as a stochastic
hybrid dynamical system (S-HDS)’’ to counter against more complex or synthetic
attacks. The system is evaluated on the KDD cup 1999 dataset and Ling-Spam
dataset. The authors created a synthetic attack space to train and evaluate the
algorithm. This approach can be extended by providing a semi-supervised or an
unsupervised solution combined with measures which qualify as the proactive
measures against network threats.
An early work for intrusion detection is by Xu and Luo [29]. The authors
modeled network intrusion detection with the help of reinforcement learning. The
intrusion detection problem is modeled in the form of a Markov decision process
(MDP) by using host-specific features in the network. Though the work is different in
nature from the one proposed in this paper, it is crucial to highlight the approach
used by the authors because it acts as an inspiration to model the problem of reactive
action against network threats as a MDP. The various frameworks presented in this
section prove to be an inspiration to learn from and extend the same for achieving
better network security.
This paper proposes a framework which intends to combine the
programmability and flexibility of SDN with the learning nature of reinforcement
learning to not only detect network threats but also autonomously take
countermeasures against such threats. It encompasses the MDP and Q-learning
algorithm to develop intelligence integrated with the SDN controller.
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CHAPTER 3
System Architecture
This chapter presents the system architecture for the intelligent threat-aware
response system in software-defined networks. It gives an explanation of the different
components of the framework in a unique combination of northbound and southbound
interfaces for knowledge discovery and data mining (KDD) process, reinforcement
learning, and the reactive actions. The three main components are as follows:
• Traffic Analyzer
A southbound interface for monitoring the network traffic propagating
through each of the switches connected in the network. The same
implementation facilitates the initial steps of the KDD process.
• Reinforcement Learning Agent
An additional component developed in the SDN controller operating system
for the implementation of the Q-learning algorithm.
• Threat Response
Another southbound interface which provides APIs to communicate with
OpenFlow and ovsdb to manage the bandwidth of the switches and also to
update flow tables on the switch.
Figure 1 depicts the component-based block diagram of this framework. In the
following sections, each component of the framework is discussed in detail.
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Figure 1 – The component-based architecture and representation of control flow
through the system
3.1 Traffic Analyzer
A threat-aware system needs to continuously monitor the network to detect
any unusual behavior. The traffic analyzer is the module responsible for the network
monitoring in the proposed framework. It collects information about the total
number of packets sent and received along with the total number of bytes sent and
received through the network. However, the total number of packets and bytes alone
do not provide much of an insight to discriminate between various types of network
threats. To achieve that, traffic analyzer module collects information specific to
different protocols such as TCP, UDP, HTTP, etc.
The traffic analyzer module is a southbound interface in the SDN controller
operating system that monitors network traffic. The OpenFlow protocol APIs allow
the controller to check for flow-specific and port-specific statistics. This framework is
implemented as a part of the RYU [15] SDN controller. RYU is an event-driven
controller wherein the southbound APIs are invoked whenever there is an appropriate
event. For example, one could set up an event listener for an OpenFlow packet and
define an API to be invoked whenever there is an incoming OpenFlow packet. In a
similar way, there are listeners for port-specific statistics on the switch. The traffic
10
analyzer sends a stats request to the switch, invoking the corresponding API for
replying with the real-time statistics.
The other perspective to network monitoring addressed in this work is one from
the KDD process. The statistics lack contextual information to derive conclusions.
This contextual information can be captured by accumulating the statistics over time
or combining together two or more values to obtain a third one. This module deals
with the initial phases of the KDD process to obtain a representation of the network
through the information collected by monitoring it.
3.1.1 Data Selection
Just as the name suggests, the data selection process involves the determination
of the respective data type and source. As discussed earlier, the selected statistics
comprise the total number of packets, the total bytes of data being transferred, and
protocol-specific information with respect to the overall values. For example, let us
suppose that 10% of the bandwidth capacity is under use in the network. The first
set of features would determine how much of that 10% is occupied by the respective
switches present in the network and then calculate what percent of the overall usage
belongs to a specific protocol. The features are computed with the help of the
network congestion function and traffic classification while transforming the data into
an appropriate representation for the reinforcement learning agent.
DoS attacks mainly focus on exhausting the bandwidth of the network or the
resources of the switch and/or a host. The information about the total number of
packets and the total size allows one to estimate the bandwidth usage to some extent.
Resource exhaustion is achieved by sending spoofed or fake requests to the victim;
therefore, protocol-specific statistics are selected to address these type of attacks.
Also, if a network is under attack, the network latency would be relatively high.
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Hence, network latency is also one of the features included during the data selection
phase.
3.1.2 Data Preprocessing
The data that exist in the natural state or exist in the world are not necessarily
in the best possible format. First of all, it is not necessary for the data to have all the
uniform values as an ideal data set. For this research, an ideal data set is one where
there are no missing or invalid values for any considered parameter. The challenge to
solve in this phase is generating the features in a synchronized manner. It is
important to measure the number of packets, the total number of bytes exchanged,
and the network latency at the same time in order to represent the network state for
that time. Even a slight shift in the measurement would lead to confusion in the
network state. For example, if the number of packets and the number of bytes are
recorded at different times, one could end up with many more bytes for a relatively
small number of packets and vice versa. Such a discrepancy in the statistics would
mislead the reinforcement learning agent and cause errors while it selects a reactive
action. During the data preprocessing step, the data are filtered to form the features
that will be used later for further computation.
3.1.3 Data Transformation
The information obtained so far lacks context. The context information allows
the framework to understand the need for taking a reactive action. That is, the
context information helps to derive some conclusion from the data. With respect to
the framework, the context information summarizes the overall behavior of the
network at a given point in time. The aim of this phase is to provide concrete
evidence that the network is congested or is under an attack. This evidence
contributes towards the intelligence of the proposed framework. The intelligence is
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not only in taking the right action given a threat, but also on the right understanding
of the network behavior. For example, if the framework scales up the bandwidth at a
time when the network does not need more bandwidth to function, it defeats the
purpose of an intelligent system. The context information is provided with the help
of network congestion function and traffic classification. Network congestion function
is one of the contributions of this research to identify the network behavior given
limited information. Traffic classification is an extension to the network congestion
function for obtaining protocol-specific congestion across the network.
3.1.4 Network Congestion Score
The very first requirement of a threat-aware response system is to know if there
is any threat to the computer network. A network threat can be identified as an
unusual behavior of the network, whether it is through the traffic or by the switches.
This unusual behavior needs to be captured through some measure to determine if
there is an active threat to the computer network. The network congestion function
carries that purpose in the framework. This function returns a congestion score which
helps the reinforcement learning agent distinguish between the normal and abnormal
network behavior. That is, the congestion score becomes the ‘‘observation’’ and input
to the reinforcement learning algorithm. Hence, congestion score allows the
intelligence module to take reactive action in case of a threat and scale up the
network resources when needed.
The network congestion score is defined as a function of throughput and
network latency. The throughput of the network indicates the number of bytes or the
rate of bytes being exchanged through the network per unit time. The network
latency on the other hand indicates the round trip-time (RTT) that a packet would
take for traveling across all the nodes of the network and returning to the origin.
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That is, the packet will originate from the switch and hop onto each of the hosts
present in the network and back to the switch. The following equation can be used to
calculate network congestion score:
Congestion Score =
{︂△𝐵
𝐵
* 100
}︂
+
{︂
1
𝑘 * 𝑛 *
△𝐿
𝐿
}︂
(1)
△𝐵 is the difference between the current speed of the port and the default
speed of the port B, the current speed is the byte rate with which the port is
transmitting data, and the default speed is the maximum speed with which the port
can transmit data. The value of n indicates the total number of links in the local
network and △𝐿 is the difference between the network latency and the ideal latency
𝐿 of the local network. The total number of links helps to determine the ideal
network latency. The importance of latency for the congestion can be specified with
the constant 𝑘. A relatively smaller value of k would increase the emphasis of
network latency in the congestion score and vice versa. The network latency has a
penalty measure just to assign a higher importance to the bandwidth usage, as most
network attacks focus on exhausting the network bandwidth.
The intuition behind this equation is very simple and can be understood with
the help of simple questions. First, how does one determine if the network is
congested? It is by the amount of data that is exchanged in the channel. The
available bandwidth of the channel indicates the maximum amount of data that can
be exchanged through the channel, and the throughput indicates the real time data
exchange. The second question to ask is, how fast does a packet travel from one end
to the other end of the network? The answer is network latency. It is necessary to
determine, given n links how much time it takes for the packet to make a round trip
of the local network. If it is an ideal network, it should be less than 1 ms per link.
Any congestion in the links would indicate the extent to which the links are
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compromised. A congested link would result in a relatively higher value of network
latency.
3.1.5 Traffic Classification
The traffic classification is an intuitive extension to the network congestion
function discussed previously. The overall network usage can be estimated through
the congestion score. The protocol-specific network usage can be estimated through
the traffic classification, that is, the number of packets and number of bytes per
packet per protocol. The term traffic classification originates from the question that,
out of the total used bandwidth, how much is occupied by a certain protocol P? For
example, if the total bandwidth usage comes out to be 70%, traffic classification for a
protocol P measures the portion of bandwidth occupied by P.
As discussed earlier, because most of the DoS attacks are protocol-specific, the
intuition behind traffic classification is to narrow down the protocol involved in the
attack. Network congestion function checks if the network is congested or not.
Similarly, traffic classification checks for the protocol-specific congestion. For the
scope of this research, HTTP, TCP, DNS, UDP, and ICMP protocols were
considered. These protocols are largely used in day-to-day applications for complex
communication carried out over the network. A southbound interface using tshark
[30] was developed to gather the protocol-specific statistics, which is then combined
with the statistics obtained from OpenFlow specific southbound APIs.
3.2 Reinforcement Learning Agent
This section explains the reinforcement learning paradigm as applied to
network security. This module is developed as a part of the RYU [15] SDN controller
operating system. Formally speaking, a reinforcement learning problem consists of
the following sub-elements:
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• Policy
• Reward Signal
• Value function
The reinforcement learning problem is the selection of the right reactive action
given the current network behavior. Let us go over each of the sub-elements of
reinforcement learning. This approach not only provides an overview of reinforcement
learning but also provides context information that facilitates the relationship
between the concept of reinforcement learning and its practical implementation for
network security.
3.2.1 Policy
According to Sutton and Barto [4] ‘‘A policy is defined as a function which
determines the action taken by a reinforcement learning agent given some state 𝑆𝑖.’’
The policy can choose any action from the set of available actions. It is
formally represented with the help of 𝜋*(𝑆). The problem is represented in a state
based system. That is, there is a set of states in which the system can be and there is
a set of actions which make the system transition from one state to another. With
reference to the learning problem in this paper, the actions would be the sub-modules
present in the threat response module.
3.2.2 Reward Signal
Reinforcement learning paradigm is reward driven. A reward can be defined as
a favorable condition being met upon taking some action. This action would
essentially make the system transition from one state to other. For example, when a
child learns to walk, the reward is moving from one place to another without being
hurt, or taking each step without falling. It could also be possible that the reward is
considered for both the situations, not falling on each step as well as not falling even
16
once while walking from the starting point to the destination. For the reinforcement
learning problem addressed by this paper, the reward signal is determined from the
input state at time t, 𝑆𝑡 and the input state at time t+1, 𝑆𝑡+1. With the help of the
congestion score and protocol-specific congestion, it is possible to determine whether
the congestion increased or decreased after taking the particular action. The same
measure becomes the key to the reward signal for the reinforcement learning agent. If
the congestion of the network at time 𝑡+ 1 did not improve by some particular action
taken at time 𝑡, the action was not really the best action that could have been taken.
The reward signal specifies the immediate reward received upon a transition.
However, there is a greater part of the reward obtained by taking the value of the
action into consideration. It is also considered the goal of a reinforcement learning
problem. After all, every problem is solved with the motivation of obtaining the
maximum possible reward.
3.2.3 Value Function
Consider a system in which the number of states, the reward of each state, and
the value of the action taken from a given state are known beforehand. This is the
ideal reinforcement learning problem that can be solved by planning or dynamic
programming. However, in the real world, even if the number of states and the
immediate reward of each state are known, the value (or long-term benefit) of an
action given a particular state is unknown. This gives rise to the concept of the value
function in the reinforcement learning problem. The overall reward for taking any
action is the sum of the immediate reward obtained from the state and the value of
the action taken with respect to the previous state.
Suppose that in a reinforcement learning problem, the agent has to find the
path from one state to another state. If the agent keeps selecting the path which
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gives the highest immediate reward, it is possible that the agent might not devise the
most optimal path to the destination. However, it is the optimal solution which is
very much desired, not just a good enough solution. The value function in a
reinforcement learning problem helps the agent determine which action or actions
correspond to the maximum long-term reward which can be obtained. The learning
problem which arises is how to determine the value of an action. It is not really
possible to estimate the value, given some state 𝑆𝑖 and some action 𝐴𝑖.
The value of an action is captured through the experience obtained by the
reinforcement learning agent over time as it interacts with the environment. The
more experience that a reinforcement learning agent has with each respective action,
the more likely it is that the agent can select the best action in case of a complex
situation. That is, if the network is currently under attack, the experience of the
reinforcement learning agent with each possible reactive action determines the
likelihood of the agent to make a wise decision. The value function is the learning
challenge in the reinforcement learning problem. It is not known beforehand, nor can
it be guessed at random. However, there are approaches with which the value
function can be approximated such as Monte Carlo simulations, Temporal difference
(TD) learning, Q-learning, etc. The approach used for this framework is Q-learning,
the working of which is explained in one of the following sections.
3.2.4 Overview: Markov Decision Processes
Markov decision processes (MDPs) are used to model decision making problems
when the outcome cannot be predetermined completely. The outcome usually has
some degree of uncertainty associated with it. Covering the concept of MDPs in depth
is beyond the scope of this paper, but this section attempts to introduce it briefly.
According to Sutton and Barto [4], ‘‘A reinforcement learning task that satisfies
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the Markov property is called a Markov decision process, or MDP.’’ The Markovian
property informally specifies that only the present matters. Consider a scenario
wherein there is some decision to be taken with respect to some parameters. If this
decision can be taken by considering only the last few values of the parameters rather
than the complete history, this system is a MDP. More formally, MDPs prove that
taking into account the entire history of parameters is equivalent to taking into
account only the recent history of the environment. Again, the proof of this is beyond
the scope of this paper. With reference to network attacks, it can be said that only
the present network behavior information or the network behavior information
collected for the past few seconds matters. If the network is under attack, the present
information collected from the network would reflect the attack, not the information
which was gathered from an attack which occurred ten days ago. With this argument,
one can say that the reinforcement learning problem that this framework is trying to
solve is a MDP. Therefore, there exists a set of actions which can solve the problem
optimally.
3.2.5 Q-learning
The reinforcement learning problem consists of the state space and the action
space. The state space consists of the information available to the agent at each point
in time 𝑡. The action space is the set of all possible actions the agent can undertake
from a particular state 𝑆𝑖. As discussed earlier, the long-term benefit of each action
with respect to the state 𝑆𝑖 is not known beforehand. Let us assume that the function
𝑄*(𝑆𝑖, 𝐴𝑖) represents the long-term benefit of the action 𝐴𝑖 taken in the particular
state 𝑆𝑖. There is also an immediate reward 𝑅𝑖 for the action and state pair. Assume
that for all 𝐴𝑖 ∈ 𝐴, where A is the set of all possible actions, the function 𝑄*(𝑆𝑖, 𝐴𝑖)
outputs real values indicating the long-term benefit of taking action 𝐴𝑖 in state 𝑆𝑖. In
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this case, it is possible to select the action that corresponds to the maximum
long-term benefit from the action space.
However, the 𝑄*(𝑠𝑖, 𝑎𝑖) function is not always known beforehand in a
reinforcement learning problem. This 𝑄*(𝑠𝑖, 𝑎𝑖) function is more commonly known as
the value function in a reinforcement learning problem and as the Q-function for
Q-learning. As discussed previously, the value function can be approximated by
accumulating experience over time. The reinforcement learning agent accumulates
experience through the interaction with the computer network. Depending on the
action, the reinforcement learning agent would receive more information from the
network. This information would then be passed to the reward signal to obtain the
immediate reward for the action. The immediate reward and the estimated long-term
benefit of the action taken form the learning process for Q-learning. The intuition
behind Q-learning is that given enough tuples of states, actions, and rewards, it is
possible to approximate the value function accurately.
Q-learning approximates this function by using a non-linear curve-fitting
approach such as neural networks. The value function is a pattern which can be
approximated by taking into account the present network behavior information and
comparing it with the previous network behavior information to obtain the reward.
The reward acts as an implicit label, and the algorithm can be trained upon it to
obtain an approximation of the value function.
The problem now becomes more of a learning through experience. As the
number of interactions with the environment increases, the Q-learning algorithm
accumulates more information. Suppose the approximated value function is
represented by 𝑄′(𝑠𝑖, 𝑎𝑖), Now as 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒→∞ the approximation of the value function
𝑄
′
(𝑠𝑖, 𝑎𝑖)→ 𝑄*(𝑠𝑖, 𝑎𝑖). It is an approach which can be summarized as pattern
recognition through experience. The function approximation is facilitated by neural
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networks, or an architecture better known as Q-networks. Q-networks learn through
experience, considering the information obtained from the environment in the next
state as an implicit label.
Another concept to be considered is one of creativity. Reinforcement learning
agents are creative by nature in terms of the developed strategies. With enough
experience, the agent can propose a novel strategy to reach the goal state or to
maximize the value obtained in the process. The fundamental idea behind this
creativity is the exploration vs. exploitation for the action space.
Given a set of actions A, it is very important that the reinforcement learning
agent evaluates each action 𝐴𝑖 from it. The above mentioned idea is more formally
known as exploration. Suppose that the reinforcement learning agent chose an action
𝐴𝑗 from the action space 𝐴, and the action turned out to be something beneficial.
Now, the value of this action would be increased as compared to the other actions as
it returned a good reward. Also, in the future, if a scenario similar to the current
scenario arises, the likelihood of choosing the same action 𝐴𝑗 increases. This concept
is called exploitation. A balance is needed between these two concepts to solve the
problem. The goal is to find the best possible actions from the action space 𝐴, and it
is necessary for the agent to try out different actions from the action space.
The agent can be forced to take up some action from the action space by just
selecting a random value at random time intervals. Let us say that for some 𝜖 and a
random real value 𝑃 ∈ [0, 1], if 𝑃 > 1− 𝜖, the reinforcement learning agent chooses a
random value and determines the reward received from it. Otherwise, it selects the
action with the maximum value of 𝑄′(𝑆𝑖, 𝐴𝑖). The value of epsilon decreases with the
number of interactions carried out by the reinforcement learning agent. The ideal
initial value of 𝜖 is 1, as 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒→∞, 𝜖→ 0. This methodology is known as 𝜖− 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑦
approach in reinforcement learning. Now that the foundation of how different
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approaches work for value function approximation has been developed, the concepts
can be combined to present the algorithm that updates the value of 𝑄′(𝑆𝑖, 𝐴𝑖),
making it closer to the ideal 𝑄*(𝑆𝑖, 𝐴𝑖) function. The algorithm used to achieve it is
known as Q-learning and is represented by the following equation, where the next
state of the system is 𝑆 ′𝑖 :
𝑄
′
(𝑆𝑖, 𝐴𝑖) = 𝑅 + 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐴′ (𝑄
′
(𝑆
′
𝑖 , 𝐴
′
𝑖)) (2)
𝑅 is the immediate reward obtained by the agent upon taking the action 𝐴𝑖. 𝛾 is the
discount factor which avoids the risk of infinite reward values when there is no
termination state in the system. The ideal value of 𝛾 is taken as 0.9 [31]. With the
above mentioned equation, the value of each action is updated. For a large enough
number of iterations, this value function approximates the ideal value function.
3.3 Threat Response
The threat response module interacts with the ovsdb and OpenFlow
southbound APIs of the SDN controller to deploy network configurations from the
framework. The configurations are selected with the help of reinforcement learning
and are deployed in real-time. As shown in Figure 1, the threat response consists of
two sub-modules: bandwidth manager and flow rule update manager. Both of these
sub-modules represent the actions which the reinforcement learning agent can take
against a network threat. This module can be easily extended with more choices for
actions against the network threat.
3.3.1 Bandwidth Manager
The bandwidth manager can be thought of as an interface which provides a
southbound API to modify the bandwidth of the switch. The value of the bandwidth
is determined by another reinforcement learning agent, making it possible for the
system to scale the bandwidth up and down as needed. The state space and action
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space for this agent are not so different from the agent that determines whether to
update bandwidth or update a flow rule. The bandwidth allocation agent takes as
input the congestion score defined in the traffic analyzer section and selects the
optimal bandwidth. The congestion score provides the estimate of the bandwidth
usage to the agent. With the help of the bandwidth usage, the agent can determine
whether the suggested bandwidth value was a profitable decision or a loss. The profit
and loss here are used in the context of reward. If the suggested bandwidth maintains
the optimal network operation, it is a positive reward. However, if the suggested
bandwidth does not affect the network congestion much, it is a negative reward.
The same learning paradigm helps the reinforcement learning agent to scale up
or scale down the bandwidth depending on the network usage on a normal basis.
This feature allows the agent to work as a resource allocation algorithm as well. The
agent is given a set of values which can be deployed as the network bandwidth, and
each one of these values becomes an action. Since the state space and action space
have been defined, the agent learns the value of each corresponding action over time
and determines the relationship between the actions and states, which maximizes the
reward given a particular state.
There are many network attacks which can be countered by simply modifying
the network bandwidth to some extent. There certainly is a large number of attacks
which can exhaust the bandwidth even after scaling, but for them, the other action
deals with the protocol-specific traffic rates in the network.
3.3.2 Flow Rule Manager
The flow rule manager is another interface which provides a southbound API to
update flow rules on the switch. This API sends an OpenFlow message to the
particular switch to indicate the update in the flow table. With the help of this API,
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the framework can add, modify, and remove rules corresponding to various packets.
There are many cases wherein just updating the bandwidth of the network does not
solve the problem. For example, in the case of HTTP GET Request Flood, it is not
the bandwidth which is exhausted in the network but the resources of the victim
server. The action could be to limit or stop the incoming HTTP traffic to a particular
switch or host in the network.
The learning switch deployed with the help of the SDN controller has an inbuilt
add_flow API to make changes in the flow table. The parameters include a match
object to a protocol, the specific actions, and the datapath of the switch. The
framework checks for the protocol-specific information which is gathered in the traffic
analyzer section. The protocol-specific features help to determine which flow rule
needs to be deployed on the corresponding switch. The protocol having a higher
density in terms of bandwidth and packets is the one which needs to be moderated.
3.4 Layer-wise grouping of DoS attacks
Denial-Of-Service (DoS) attacks focus on disrupting the victim service or the
victim network for the legitimate users or legitimate hosts, respectively. These
attacks exploit the features of different protocols and misuse them, and can be
classified based on the various layers of the TCP/IP model as follows:
3.4.1 Attacks on the IP Layer
A basic network attack targeting the IP layer is MAC flooding. This attack
involves flooding the switch with data packets, which draw out the legitimate MAC
address and imitate a unicast behavior by sending traffic to the areas of network
where it is not intended to go. The methods to mitigate this attack might involve
limiting the number of MAC addresses learned through a particular port,
authentication of MAC addresses, etc. Another attack on this layer involves ICMP
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flooding. This attack is a volumetric attack which focuses on overloading the network
bandwidth. The adversary floods the network with ICMP echo requests until the
server or the machine exhausts all the resources in replying to the message. A typical
way to mitigate this attack is by filtering ICMP echo requests or rate limiting them.
It is also known as the Smurf Attack.
3.4.2 Attacks on the Transport layer
The attacks on the transport layer exploit the TCP and UDP protocols. Most
of the communication is carried out through the transport layer, as many of the
applications use TCP/UDP in the underlying process. The two main attacks on the
transport layer are the TCP SYN Flood attack and the UDP Flood attack.
SYN Flood: The TCP protocol is a connection oriented protocol and this
connection is facilitated through a three-way handshake. SYN flood attack exploits
the three-way handshake to hinder the services provided by any server by sending
spoofed or fake SYN requests to the server. Upon receiving a SYN request, a network
server would simply acknowledge it and wait for a reply. However, in case of a SYN
flood, the reply never arrives, thereby hindering the functionality of the server. This
attack can be mitigated by limiting the number of SYN requests, filtering the SYN
requests, or even a timer to SYN RECEIVED.
UDP Flood: As the name suggests, this attack involves sending a huge number of
UDP packets to the victim. The victim cannot process the large influx of packets all
at once and hence remains occupied. Because of this, it cannot process the legitimate
traffic or requests. The victim would simply reply with the destination host
unreachable ICMP reply, as the packet would be spoofed. This attack can be
mitigated with the help of appropriate firewalls.
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3.4.3 Attacks on the Application Layer
The attacks on the application layer exploit the vulnerabilities in the
applications, such as an HTTP server, DNS and Ping. Each application has some
procedure to deal with communication, whether it is in request and response form or
echo and reply form. The same procedure which allows the applications to work
perfectly, is also the one which leads to exploitation.
HTTP Flood Attacks: As the name suggests, these attacks involve sending a
large number of HTTP POST requests to the server. By nature, this attack is a
resource consumption attack, as the victim cannot process the large number of POST
requests in time, resulting in high utilization of system resources or a crash in the
worst case. Similarly, one could achieve the same goal with the help of an HTTP
GET Flood, which involves the influx of a large number of HTTP GET requests. A
reasonable way to mitigate this attack is by monitoring the application which is
accepting such requests.
NTP Amplification Attack: NTP is a UDP based protocol which can be
exploited to return a large reply to a small request. Using the same property, a
resource consumption attack can be launched against a server. The NTP protocol has
a ‘‘monlist’’ command which returns the total number of servers which the NTP
server has contacted. Given a number of open NTP servers, one could easily
accomplish an amplification attack resulting into a DDoS attack. This attack is an
amplification attack, as the response packet size is much larger than the request
packet size. A typical way to mitigate this attack is by securing the NTP client.
DNS Amplification Attack: A DNS server upon receiving a "ANY" request
returns all information about that host to the source IP address, thereby making the
response packet size much larger than the request packet size. In a DNS
amplification attack, the adversary spoofs DNS lookup requests with the IP address
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of the victim and sends "ANY" requests to open DNS servers. All these servers
would then respond by sending out all the information they know about the
requested IP address, and this information would be sent to the victim. This attack
can be mitigated by reducing the number of recursive resolvers. This work covers
ICMP flooding, TCP SYN flooding, UDP flooding, HTTP GET request flood, and
DNS amplification attack. The performance of the framework with respect to each
attack scenario is discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
Evaluation
The proposed framework is evaluated by deploying it with a network topology.
An SDN controller can best be tested by allowing it to handle the operations for
which it was developed. In the same way, the proposed framework can be best tested
by allowing it to protect a network against attacks. The network topology can be
simulated with the help of mininet [32]. It is a network simulation tool that makes
use of Linux containers to simulate switches and hosts on the system.
The other aspect to testing is simulating normal network traffic. In case of a
real network, there are various users using their systems to fetch different sorts of
information. For testing purposes, it is possible to simulate usual or normal traffic
using traffic generators. A traffic generator is a tool that takes in the type of packets
to generate, the number of packets to generate, and the destination IP addresses.
One such traffic generation tool is Ostinato [33]. It can be used through the GUI or
the Python API. The following steps show the working of the tool and the equivalent
actions on the GUI are demonstrated in Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, and
Figure 6.
1. Create a new stream under the interface.
2. Select the Layer 3 protocol version and Layer 4 protocol type.
3. Enter the custom protocol data. [If needed]
4. Enter the total number of packets to send, that is, the number of packets per
second.
5. Choose the source and destination IP addresses; it is possible to make them
both random.
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6. Apply the stream on the port and start it.
Figure 2 – Adding a new stream to Ostinato
Figure 3 – Configuring the stream with L3 and L4 protocols
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Figure 4 – Configuring the protocol data
Figure 5 – Configuring the values in the stream
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Figure 6 – Configuring the source and destination for the packets
4.1 Generating the Attacks
The framework is evaluated against UDP flood, TCP SYN flood, ICMP flood,
HTTP GET request flood, and DNS amplification attack. These attacks are some of
the most well-known DoS attacks, and despite the simplicity, each attack is prevalent.
The first step is to isolate the adversary machine. For evaluating this framework, a
host from the available hosts is selected from the simulated topology, and the IP
address of the host is changed so that it belongs to a different subnet. The host IP
address can be preset if the mininet topology is created using the Python API or it
can be set using the ifconfig and netmask commands as follows:
h1 ifconfig <interface> <new IP address> netmask <appropriate netmask>
The above example can be used with a host ℎ1 in mininet. The new IP address
can be set to 10.0.1.1 from 10.0.0.1 by using a different netmask, per the need. The
adversary has been identified and so has the normal traffic flow. The next step is to
generate the DoS attacks. These attacks involve a large number of packets, and there
are many sophisticated tools with which one can carry them out for research
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purposes. These tools involve hping3 [34], Metaspolit [35], and Scapy [36]. A simple
UDP attack can also be implemented by using Python socket programming APIs.
The TCP SYN flood, UDP flood, and ICMP flood were generated with the help of
hping3 tool. The following command can be used to deploy a TCP SYN flood attack
on the victim of choice:
hping3 -S -P -U --flood -V --rand-source <victim-IP/URL>
By default, this command would run infinitely, but the number of packets can
be limited by using the -c option and specifying the total number of packets to send.
The port can be specified as well with the -p option of the command. One more
attack that can be carried out using hping3 is the UDP flood attack. It is possible to
specify the bytes per packet using the -d option followed by the size of each packet in
bytes. The following command carries out a UDP flood on port 53.
hping3 -udp -p 53 -flood-rand-source <victim-IP/URL>
An alternate way to carry out a DoS attack is by wrapping up the hping3 system call
in the Python programming language and setting up a loop against different port
numbers. This attack would be difficult to manage, as multiple threads would be
flooding the network. The ICMP attack can also be generated with the help of hping3.
There are ICMP attacks with various codes, and for the testing of this framework it
is ICMP echo flood. The following command is used to generate the flood:
hping3 --icmp -C 8 -K 0 --flood <victim-IP/URL>
The ICMP code and ICMP type are specified using the -K and -C options in the
attack. The HTTP GET request flood and DNS amplification attacks were simulated
with the help of Python scripts. Using BaseHTTPServer module in Python, it is very
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easy to create a victim server that can respond to GET requests. With the help of an
infinite loop or multiple threads, one can send a large number of HTTP GET
requests with spoofed IP addresses. The DNS amplification attack is carried out with
an automated Python script as well. A large list of domain names to be resolved is
prepared for the DNS server, and each one of the requests is sent through the script
by spoofing the source address as the victim’s IP address.
4.2 Network Topologies
The reinforcement learning agent learns through experience with the computer
network. The goal is to make the agent understand the various scenarios of network
attacks, so that it can learn to take complex decisions in real-time. This section
explains the testbeds used for evaluating the framework. These testbeds are
simulated with the help of mininet [32].
Figure 7 showcases a very simple network topology generated with the help of
mininet [32]. This simple topology is a linear topology of a network consisting of one
switch and three hosts connected to the switch. It is a learning switch facilitated with
the help of OpenFlow [1] protocol, and simulated with the help of OpenVSwitch. The
initial evaluation of any framework is easier with the help of a small scale network
topology instead of a large scale one. The small scale network topology allows for
easy debugging in terms of an error, and the results can be seen immediately. Also,
with a smaller number of hosts connected to the switch, the network monitoring
becomes simple as well. Considering the perspective of reinforcement learning agent,
the agent first learns the complexity of a small scale environment, thereby making it
possible to derive a conclusion whether or not it is feasible to deploy the agent on a
relatively complex network topology. The results obtained with this network
topology align with this view.
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Figure 7 – A linear network topology with 3 hosts and one switch
Another viewpoint is, when the agent is first deployed and tested with a simple
network topology, it is possible to also make a conclusion on how well the framework
scales with a more complex network topology. Figure 8 shows a linear topology with
six switches and twelve hosts. It allows for the reinforcement learning agent to be a
part of a more diverse environment. With an increase in the number of hosts, the
normal network usage increases as well. The first learning curve for the agent is to
accommodate itself with the change in the environment. The next section presents
the experimental results obtained with the help of the proposed framework.
Figure 8 – A more complex linear network topology with six switches and twelve hosts
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4.3 Experimental Results
The framework was tested iteratively against the different DoS attacks. This
stepwise training of the reinforcement learning agent helps build a more robust
understanding of various reactive actions in various scenarios. At first, the agent was
trained against a UDP flood DoS, and then the other type of DoS attack was
simulated on the network. This new attack would appear to be a zero-day attack to
the agent, and it would adjust the value for each reactive action to counter the
attack. This process was repeated with a set of five DoS attacks to evaluate the
overall performance of the framework.
The framework was evaluated on the basis of percentage packet loss for an
intended user of the service or a legitimate request made to the victim host. A basic
UDP server was deployed on the victim host, and the client was deployed on one of
the benign hosts to calculate the packet loss. The client tracks the total number of
packets sent and received from the server. For every packet that the server does not
respond to, it accumulates the packet loss with respect to the total number of packets
sent. It is evident from the results obtained, that the framework reduces the packet
loss by at least 70-80% as compared to the test results on RYU SDN controller
without using the framework.
4.3.1 UDP Flood Attack
As the name suggests, a UDP flood attack douses a victim server with UDP
packets. For the purpose of this attack on both testbeds, a simple UDP Server was
set up on the victim host. The flood attack was carried out with the help of hping3
tool. The flood size determines the number of UDP packets which were used in the
attack. For example, an attack of 500 Megabytes indicates a total of 5000000 packets
sent, each having a size of 100 bytes. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the results
35
obtained on testbed 1 and testbed 2 respectively.
Figure 9 – Packet loss with and without framework in case of UDP flood on testbed 1
Figure 10 – Packet loss with and without framework in case of UDP flood on testbed
2
It is evident from the results that the packet loss is quite high when the
framework is not deployed in the network. However, once the framework is deployed,
the SDN Controller manages to thwart the attack to a great extent. Even though
there is some packet loss after that too, it is not as significant as without using the
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framework.
4.3.2 TCP SYN Flood Attack
Next, the reinforcement learning agent or rather the framework was tested with
a TCP SYN flood attack. Since it was the first time the framework comes across a
TCP SYN flood attack, it could be considered as a zero day attack. The
reinforcement learning agent does learn how to tackle it, and the number of
interactions it took to do so are depicted in the latter part of this chapter. However,
the motive of training the framework like this was to inspire the reinforcement
learning agent to explore more actions. The TCP SYN flood attack is focused more
on exhausting the resources of the victim host rather than exhausting the bandwidth.
Therefore, an appropriate action in this case would be to moderate the incoming TCP
SYN Requests.
This attack focuses on sending spoofed TCP SYN packets to the victim. It
exploits the three-way TCP Handshake. Since the IP addresses are spoofed, the
handshake is never completed and the victim keeps waiting for the sender to respond.
In this way, the resource exhaustion is achieved in a TCP SYN flood attack. Figure
11 and Figure 12 show the packet loss with and without the framework on testbed 1
and testbed 2, respectively.
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Figure 11 – Packet loss with and without framework in case of TCP SYN flood on
testbed 1
Figure 12 – Packet loss with and without framework in case of TCP SYN flood on
testbed 2
Packet loss is measured as the number of legitimate TCP SYN requests being
refused as the victim is too busy. This attack is simulated using hping3 tool and the
legitimate TCP SYN packets are generated through a Python script, which also keeps
an account for the packet loss.
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4.3.3 ICMP Flood Attack
Ping application is used to check if there is an active host for the corresponding
IP address or URL. The same utility is exploited to send a multitude of ICMP
requests that force the victim to respond with an ICMP packet. It is a classic
resource consumption attack wherein the victim server becomes too busy in handling
all the incoming ICMP requests. However, an ICMP packet does not have a higher
priority such as HTTP or TCP, so it might get ignored. The main targets of these
types of flood attacks are the switches because a switch is responsible to forward all
such packets to the respective hosts. Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the results
obtained on both testbeds under an ICMP flood attack.
Figure 13 – Packet loss with and without framework in case of ICMP/Ping flood on
testbed 1
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Figure 14 – Packet loss with and without framework in case of ICMP/Ping flood on
testbed 2
The goal of ICMP flood attack might be to disconnect the victim from the
network by making it busy. Once the victim is busy enough, it might not respond or
collect information necessary to stay connected in the network. The reinforcement
learning agent iteratively learns the type of attack and also learns the optimal action
necessary to counter it.
4.3.4 HTTP GET Request flood Attack
The HTTP GET Request flood attack is an application layer DoS attack
targeted on an HTTP Server. The target is to flood the server with enough fake
requests that it cannot handle legitimate requests. All different kinds of DoS attacks
share essentially the same goal. The packet loss is taken into account as the number
of legitimate HTTP GET Requests that were refused service. Figure 15 and Figure
16 showcase the results on testbed 1 and testbed 2 with and without the framework
respectively.
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Figure 15 – Packet loss with and without framework in case of HTTP GET Request
flood on testbed 1
Figure 16 – Packet loss with and without framework in case of HTTP GET Request
on testbed 2
4.3.5 DNS Amplification Attack
The last attack which the reinforcement learning agent is trained against is a
DNS Amplification Attack. In this attack the adversary sends spoofed DNS requests
to DNS servers. The DNS Servers resolve the request and send their responses back
to the origin. The origin address is the address of the victim. This attack can be
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carried out on a large scale as the number of Open DNS Servers available is high and
most of these DNS Servers have a very high bandwidth. It might be perceived as
though these DNS servers are executing a DDoS attack on the victim.
However, the DNS protocol does contain a UDP packet underneath it. These
UDP packets can be regulated in the network in order to thwart the amplification
attack. This attack is not focused only on bandwidth exhaustion but also on resource
exhaustion for the victim. Whenever the victim receives a DNS response it starts
processing it, and with enough DNS responses, the victim would be so busy
processing these responses that the more important traffic might be overlooked.
A simple Python script is used to simulate a DNS amplification attack. The
packet loss is accounted for by using simple UDP Client and server programs across
the network. Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the results with the help of the
framework on testbeds 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 17 – Packet loss with and without framework in case of DNS Amplification on
testbed 1
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Figure 18 – Packet loss with and without framework in case of DNS Amplification on
testbed 2
Apart from the iterative training of the reinforcement learning agent on various
types of DoS attacks, the other aspect of evaluation is how quickly the reinforcement
learning agent learns to select the optimal or the right action as per the standard
strategy. For example, the standard strategy for a UDP flood might be increasing the
bandwidth, but for a UDP flood with a higher intensity, it would be to moderate
UDP traffic using a flow rule.
Figure 19 shows the number of interactions the reinforcement learning agent
made before choosing the correct action. Each attack is repeated ten times to get an
estimate of the learning curve for the reinforcement learning agent. There is a lot of
variance in the number of interactions made, and the reinforcement learning agent
does not take too many interactions as well. The main reason for it is the number of
actions in the framework; at present, the framework supports two major actions. The
first one is bandwidth management in the computer network and the other one is
flow rule management. There are different flow rules under the flow rule management
action, and each of these flow rules are selected by looking at the protocol-specific
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features obtained during traffic classification. It is possible that, with the increase in
the number of actions, the reinforcement learning agent takes more interactions to
arrive at the correct action for the particular scenario.
Figure 19 – The learning curve of the agent w.r.t. various network attacks
The last test which was carried out on the framework was one of bandwidth
allocation. It is possible that at some point in time, the computer network is busier
than usual. Maybe all the users were streaming live videos or playing games. This
framework was developed with a major focus on handling different types of network
attacks, but it also has an additional feature of bandwidth management. It can be
configured to act like a resource allocation agent as well. Table 1 shows the various
values of the bandwidth suggested by the reinforcement learning agent under
different network congestion scenarios.
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Table 1 – Evaluating Optimal Bandwidth Allocation
Case Network Congestion(%) Suggested Bandwidth(Mbps)
1 99.98 92-96
2 85.47 79-83
3 50.32 41-43
4 10.39 4-7
It is clear from all the results that were obtained, that the framework works
reasonably well against various DoS attacks. However, there were challenges faced
during the process to obtain such results. These challenges include simulation
techniques for the various attacks to the deployment of the framework and the
learning of the reinforcement learning agent. Overall, the agent counters the network
attacks to a greater extent. Hence, it gives sufficient background on further
implementation of an intelligent network security module with SDN.
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CHAPTER 5
Discussion
The goal of this framework is to protect the network from DoS attacks. These
attacks can target the hosts and/or the switches that make up the network. The
controller handles topology management, provides an interface to collect switch
statistics, and uploads appropriate flow rules on the switches. With the same features
and an added southbound interface to push changes in the switch configurations, the
framework protects the entire network against attacks. The framework forms a
successful relationship between the network behavior and the reactive action space
which helps to counter various network attacks.
5.1 Memory Usage Comparison
The controller loads the reinforcement learning agent along with the analyses
modules in memory to make a decision against network attacks. The decision
specifies the reactive action which needs to be taken for thwarting the network threat
or stabilizing the network operation. The reactive actions are deployed on the
switches individually. Thus, it is important to evaluate memory usage of the
controller with and without the framework. There is an increase in memory usage as
the framework loads the reinforcement learning agent and the tshark [30] library in
memory. However, the usage stays constant even with an increase in the number of
switches connected to the controller. Figure 20 shows the memory usage comparison
of the controller with and without the framework.
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Figure 20 – Comparison of memory usage
The memory usage statistics were obtained using the ‘‘top’’ terminal utility
command. The graph shows the physical memory used by the controller when it is
deployed in network topologies with a different number of switches. Each one of
these switches is monitored for collecting statistics, and the reactive actions are
pushed switch-wise; thus the memory usage is taken with reference to the number of
switches in the network. The increasing number of switches does not have an impact
on the memory used by the framework. The memory used by the framework is nearly
constant as the number of switches increases. The difference in memory usage with
and without the framework suggests that the reinforcement learning agent needs a
certain amount of memory to function. However, it is a memory difference which can
be accommodated by the present day switches with ease.
The experimental results discussed in Chapter 4 prove that the congestion score
and other protocol-specific features calculated in the traffic analyzer module are
effective representations of the network behavior. The effectiveness is proven through
the actions taken by the reinforcement learning agent. There is no accuracy which can
be measured in terms of such an agent, but the impact on the network turns out to
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be a valuable metric in its performance. The frequency with which the agent arrives
at the correct action shows the exploration vs. exploitation concept in real-time. The
actions selected by the agent are executed in less than one second. Overall, the
proposed framework asserts that with reinforcement learning the capabilities of SDN
can be increased significantly, especially in the area of network security.
From an implementation perspective, RYU [15] is a component-based,
event-driven controller which allows for fast prototyping. The main advantage of
using RYU is its smaller code density and modular implementation. The security
measures can very well be integrated with an enterprise-grade controller, but the
importance lies in evaluation of the framework’s usefulness. This paper covers DoS
attacks for evaluating the framework. However, there are many other network
attacks that target software-defined networks. It is possible to develop a multi-agent
reinforcement learning solution to cover different scenarios across the network. Other
approaches as well as extensions to the framework are discussed in Chapter 6.
The reinforcement learning agent first starts off with a random action given the
𝜖− 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑦 approach. It solves the cold start problem, wherein the agent does not
have prior experience with the environment. With time, the agent accumulates
experience for each reactive action and the understanding of network state to make
an intelligent decision. The average number of iterations it takes from switching over
to an intelligent action from a random action is three to four. However, the number
of iterations depends on how well the random action worked for the network
environment. If the action worked out well for the network, the value for that action
would increase automatically. In the upcoming iterations, the likelihood of the
reinforcement learning agent choosing that action increases.
There are other approaches which can be used to train the agent. One of these
approaches is to train the network in a live environment. The reinforcement learning
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agent can accumulate more information about the network behavior and take an even
better action against a network attack, as the dynamics of a live environment are
much different. However, in a simulated environment such as the one presented in
this paper, the agent can acquire enough prior experience to handle the live network
properly. The agent can also be trained with different network attacks to incorporate
more actions in the action space.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis proposed a framework that can autonomously protect the network
against attacks. The framework does so by forming a successful non-linear
relationship between the state space and the action space. The state space is the
information collected to represent network behavior and the action space is the set of
reactive actions defined to protect the network. The framework has a traffic analyzer
module which calculates the state space and a threat response module that forms the
action space. Both of these modules make use of the southbound interfaces and
provide southbound APIs to monitor and protect the network. The reinforcement
learning agent forms the non-linear relationship between network behavior and
reactive action space through the experience gathered from the interactions with the
network. With a large number of interactions, the agent accumulates enough
information to even thwart unknown attacks on the network in the future. The
iterative evaluation of the framework was carried out to estimate the behavior in case
of a previously unknown attack. As shown by the results, the framework performs
quite well in defending the network.
However, this implementation supports only the bandwidth management and
traffic moderation through flow rule management action. More actions such as
setting up VLANs, restricting the traffic specific to the port, and routing path
changes can be incorporated to make an even more complete solution. Also, this
framework can be extended by using other enterprise-grade SDN controllers. The
framework prototype focuses on defending the network against DoS attacks; future
work will focus on implementing a generic framework for all types of network attacks.
It is hoped that this work would serve as an inspiration for other researchers to
pursue intelligent security measures in software-defined networks and extend the
50
same to an even higher level.
51
LIST OF REFERENCES
[1] N. McKeown, T. Anderson, H. Balakrishnan, G. Parulkar, L. Peterson,
J. Rexford, S. Shenker, and J. Turner, ‘‘Openflow: Enabling innovation in
campus networks,’’ SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 38, no. 2, pp.
69--74, Mar. 2008. DOI: 10.1145/1355734.1355746. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1355746
[2] L. H. Newman, ‘‘What we know about friday’s massive east coast internet
outage,’’ Oct 2016, as accessed on 04/05/2017. [Online]. Available:
https://www.wired.com/2016/10/internet-outage-ddos-dns-dyn/
[3] D. Bisson, ‘‘The 5 most significant ddos attacks of 2016,’’ Nov 2016, as accessed
on 04/05/2017. [Online]. Available:
https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-
security/5-significant-ddos-attacks-2016/
[4] R. S. Sutton and A. G. Barto, Reinforcement learning: An introduction.
Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1998, vol. 1, no. 1. [Online]. Available:
https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/reinforcement-learning
[5] J. Schatzmann, K. Weilhammer, M. Stuttle, and S. Young, ‘‘A survey of
statistical user simulation techniques for reinforcement-learning of dialogue
management strategies,’’ Knowl. Eng. Rev., vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 97--126, Jun. 2006.
DOI: 10.1017/S0269888906000944. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1166054
[6] S. L. Waslander, G. M. Hoffmann, J. S. Jang, and C. J. Tomlin, ‘‘Multi-agent
quadrotor testbed control design: integral sliding mode vs. reinforcement
learning,’’ in IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and
Systems, Aug 2005. DOI: 10.1109/IROS.2005.1545025. ISSN 2153-0858 pp.
3712--3717. [Online]. Available:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/1545025/
[7] ‘‘Software-defined networking: The new norm for networks,’’ Open Networking
Foundation, Apr. 13 2012. [Online]. Available:
https://www.opennetworking.org/images/stories/downloads/sdn-
resources/white-papers/wp-sdn-newnorm.pdf
[8] A. Servin and D. Kudenko, ‘‘Multi-agent reinforcement learning for intrusion
detection,’’ in Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems III. Adaptation and
Multi-Agent Learning: 5th, 6th, and 7th European Symposium, ALAMAS
52
2005-2007 on Adaptive and Learning Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Revised
Selected Papers, K. Tuyls, A. Nowe, Z. Guessoum, and D. Kudenko, Eds.
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2008, pp. 211--223. ISBN 978-3-540-77949-0.
[Online]. Available:
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-77949-0_15
[9] N. Sengupta and J. Sil, ‘‘Comparison of supervised learning and reinforcement
learning in intrusion domain,’’ in Wireless Networks and Computational
Intelligence: 6th International Conference on Information Processing, ICIP 2012,
Bangalore, India, August 10-12, 2012. Proceedings, K. R. Venugopal and L. M.
Patnaik, Eds. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2012, pp. 546--551. ISBN
978-3-642-31686-9. [Online]. Available:
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-31686-9_63
[10] K. Malialis and D. Kudenko, ‘‘Distributed response to network intrusions using
multiagent reinforcement learning,’’ Eng. Appl. Artif. Intell., vol. 41, pp. 270 --
284, 2015. DOI: 10.1016/j.engappai.2015.01.013. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S095219761500024X
[11] N. Sengupta, J. Sen, J. Sil, and M. Saha, ‘‘Designing of on line intrusion
detection system using rough set theory and q-learning algorithm,’’
Neurocomputing, vol. 111, pp. 161 -- 168, 2013. DOI:
10.1016/j.neucom.2012.12.023. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092523121300060X
[12] P. J. Chen and Y. W. Chen, ‘‘Implementation of sdn based network intrusion
detection and prevention system,’’ in 2015 International Carnahan Conference
on Security Technology (ICCST), Sept 2015. DOI: 10.1109/CCST.2015.7389672
pp. 141--146. [Online]. Available:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7389672/
[13] S. Shin, V. Yegneswaran, P. Porras, and G. Gu, ‘‘Avant-guard: Scalable and
vigilant switch flow management in software-defined networks,’’ in Proceedings
of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer &#38; Communications
Security, ser. CCS ’13. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2013. DOI:
10.1145/2508859.2516684. ISBN 978-1-4503-2477-9 pp. 413--424. [Online].
Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2516684
[14] H. Hu, W. Han, G.-J. Ahn, and Z. Zhao, ‘‘Flowguard: Building robust firewalls
for software-defined networks,’’ in Proceedings of the Third Workshop on Hot
Topics in Software Defined Networking, ser. HotSDN ’14. New York, NY, USA:
ACM, 2014. DOI: 10.1145/2620728.2620749. ISBN 978-1-4503-2989-7 pp. 97--102.
[Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2620749
53
[15] ‘‘Ryu sdn framework[software],’’ 2014. [Online]. Available:
https://osrg.github.io/ryu/
[16] H. Padekar, Y. Park, H. Hu, and S.-Y. Chang, ‘‘Enabling dynamic access control
for controller applications in software-defined networks,’’ in Proceedings of the
21st ACM on Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, ser.
SACMAT ’16. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016. DOI:
10.1145/2914642.2914647. ISBN 978-1-4503-3802-8 pp. 51--61. [Online].
Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2914647
[17] B. Wang, Y. Zheng, W. Lou, and Y. T. Hou, ‘‘{DDoS} attack protection in the
era of cloud computing and software-defined networking,’’ Computer Networks,
vol. 81, pp. 308 -- 319, 2015. DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2015.02.026. [Online].
Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389128615000742
[18] S. Lim, J. Ha, H. Kim, Y. Kim, and S. Yang, ‘‘A sdn-oriented ddos blocking
scheme for botnet-based attacks,’’ in Sixth International Conference on
Ubiquitous and Future Networks (ICUFN), July 2014. DOI:
10.1109/ICUFN.2014.6876752. ISSN 2165-8528 pp. 63--68. [Online]. Available:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6876752/
[19] H. Wang, L. Xu, and G. Gu, ‘‘Floodguard: A dos attack prevention extension in
software-defined networks,’’ in 45th Annual IEEE/IFIP International
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, June 2015. DOI:
10.1109/DSN.2015.27. ISSN 1530-0889 pp. 239--250. [Online]. Available:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7266854/
[20] R. Braga, E. Mota, and A. Passito, ‘‘Lightweight ddos flooding attack detection
using nox/openflow,’’ in IEEE Local Computer Network Conference, Denver,
CO, Oct 2010. DOI: 10.1109/LCN.2010.5735752. ISSN 0742-1303 pp. 408--415.
[Online]. Available: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/5735752/
[21] N. Gude, T. Koponen, J. Pettit, B. Pfaff, M. Casado, N. McKeown, and
S. Shenker, ‘‘Nox: Towards an operating system for networks,’’ SIGCOMM
Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 105--110, Jul. 2008. DOI:
10.1145/1384609.1384625. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1384625
[22] Y. Feng, R. Guo, D. Wang, and B. Zhang, ‘‘Research on the active ddos filtering
algorithm based on ip flow,’’ in Fifth International Conference on Natural
Computation, vol. 4, Tianjin, China, Aug 2009. DOI: 10.1109/ICNC.2009.550.
ISSN 2157-9555 pp. 628--632. [Online]. Available:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/5363277/
54
[23] J. H. Jafarian, E. Al-Shaer, and Q. Duan, ‘‘Openflow random host mutation:
Transparent moving target defense using software defined networking,’’ in
Proceedings of the First Workshop on Hot Topics in Software Defined Networks,
ser. HotSDN ’12. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2012. DOI:
10.1145/2342441.2342467. ISBN 978-1-4503-1477-0 pp. 127--132. [Online].
Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2342467
[24] C. J. Chung, P. Khatkar, T. Xing, J. Lee, and D. Huang, ‘‘Nice: Network
intrusion detection and countermeasure selection in virtual network systems,’’
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput., vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 198--211, July 2013.
DOI: 10.1109/TDSC.2013.8. [Online]. Available:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6419708/
[25] U. Fiore, F. Palmieri, A. Castiglione, and A. D. Santis, ‘‘Network anomaly
detection with the restricted boltzmann machine,’’ Neurocomputing, vol. 122, pp.
13 -- 23, 2013. DOI: 10.1016/j.neucom.2012.11.050 Advances in cognitive and
ubiquitous computing. Selected papers from the Sixth International Conference
on Innovative Mobile and Internet Services in Ubiquitous Computing
(IMIS-2012). [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925231213005547
[26] J. Cannady, ‘‘Next generation intrusion detection: Autonomous reinforcement
learning of network attacks,’’ in Proceedings of the 23rd National Information
Systems Security Conference, 2000, pp. 1--12. [Online]. Available:
http://csrc.nist.gov/nissc/2000/proceedings/papers/033.pdf
[27] P. Wang, K. M. Chao, H. C. Lin, W. H. Lin, and C. C. Lo, ‘‘An efficient flow
control approach for sdn-based network threat detection and migration using
support vector machine,’’ in IEEE 13th International Conference on e-Business
Engineering (ICEBE), Nov 2016. DOI: 10.1109/ICEBE.2016.020 pp. 56--63.
[Online]. Available: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7809901/
[28] R. Colbaugh and K. Glass, ‘‘Proactive defense for evolving cyber threats,’’ in
Proceedings of 2011 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security
Informatics, July 2011. DOI: 10.1109/ISI.2011.5984062 pp. 125--130. [Online].
Available: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/5984062/
[29] X. Xu and Y. Luo, ‘‘A kernel-based reinforcement learning approach to dynamic
behavior modeling of intrusion detection,’’ in Advances in Neural Networks --
ISNN 2007: 4th International Symposium on Neural Networks, ISNN 2007,
Nanjing, China, June 3-7, 2007, Proceedings, Part I, D. Liu, S. Fei, Z.-G. Hou,
H. Zhang, and C. Sun, Eds. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2007, pp. 455--464.
ISBN 978-3-540-72383-7. [Online]. Available:
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-540-72383-7_54?LI=true
55
[30] ‘‘tshark: Dump and analyze network traffic[software].’’ [Online]. Available:
https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html
[31] E. Even-Dar and Y. Mansour, ‘‘Learning rates for q-learning,’’ J. Mach. Learn.
Res., vol. 5, pp. 1--25, Dec 2003. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1005332.1005333
[32] B. Lantz, B. Heller, N. Handigol, and V. Jeyakumar, ‘‘Mininet: An instant
virtual network on your laptop[software],’’ 2016. [Online]. Available:
http://mininet.org
[33] P. Srivats, ‘‘Ostinato: Network traffic generator and analyzer[software],’’ N.D.
[Online]. Available: http://ostinato.org
[34] S. Sanfilippio, ‘‘Hping - active network security tool[software],’’ 2006--2013.
[Online]. Available: http://www.hping.org
[35] ‘‘Metasploit.’’ [Online]. Available: https://www.metasploit.com/
[36] ‘‘Scapy[software].’’ [Online]. Available: http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/
56
